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Nihilism, Neonihilism, Hypernihilism: 
‘Nietzsche aujourd’hui’ Today? 
The theme of ‘the politics of difference’1 recalls the French readings of Nietzsche which 
crystallized, almost a half-century ago, at the 1972 conference at Cerisy-la-Salle, Nietzsche 
aujourd’hui?2 Nietzsche’s fortunes have since undergone some dramatic shifts in France, but 
there are signs that he is once again on the ascendency. One of the most important of these 
signs is the 2016 edited collection Pourquoi nous sommes Nietzschéens.3 (The title is a direct 
riposte to the 1991 collection Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas Nietzschéens, which largely took 
aim at Nietzsche’s politics.4) While a wide range of themes was covered at Cerisy in 1972, we 
might say that the meaning of Nietzsche for a politics of difference was centred on the twin 
critiques of humanism and capitalism, distinctive of French intellectual concerns of the time. 
Likewise, a wide range of themes are represented in the 2016 volume. I want to select from 
these a theme which, while far from ubiquitous, might plausibly be claimed as marking 
something distinctively new about the revival of interest in Nietzsche today. This is the theme 
of technology. Such a theme is announced by one of the contributors, Bernard Stiegler, as a 
leading vector in the development of nihilism since Nietzsche’s own time: 
what characterises the two centuries that for Nietzsche remained still entirely to come, that he sees 
coming in his present, from his epoch, is the fact that the second industrial revolution takes place, 
and that it does so as, precisely, the intensification of industrial becoming.5 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society, 
with the theme of ‘The Politics of Difference’, Newcastle University, 20-21 September, 2018. 
2 The proceedings were published in two volumes, edited by Maurice de Candillac and Bernard Pautrat: 
Nietzsche aujourd’hui? Tome 1 – Intensités; Tome 2 – Passions, Paris 1973 (reissued 2011). 
3 Dorian Astor and Alain Jugnon (eds.), Pourquoi nous sommes Nietzschéens, Brussels, 2016. Among other 
signs we may also note that a one-day symposium entitled „Nietzsche, aujourd’hui: Au fils conducteur du 
corps“ was held at the Catholic Institute of Paris on 5 December 2017. See Alain Jugnon’s introduction to 
Pourquoi nous sommes Nietzschéens for a brief overview of the changing reception of Nietzsche in France. 
4 Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut (eds.), Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas Nietzschéens, Paris 1991. Translated by 
Robert de Loaiza: Why We Are Not Nietzscheans, Chicago, ILL. 1997. 
5 Berneard Stiegler, The Decadence of Industrial Democracies, trans. Daniel Ross, Cambridge 2011, 56.  
Author Accepted Manuscript version of Woodward, A 2019, 'Nihilism, Neonihilism, Hypernihilism: ‘Nietzsche 
aujourd’hui’ Today? ' Nietzsche-Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch für die Nietzsche-Forschung. https://
www.degruyter.com/view/j/niet?rskey=IBmH1V&result=273&q=
The “two centuries” Stiegler alludes to here are those famously announced by Nietzsche as the 
unflolding of nihilism,6 and the industrial revolutions have led to the vast technologisation of 
contemporary life, including today the ubiquity of computing and the technologies of 
information and communication. 
 
In his introduction to Pourquoi nous sommes Nietzschéens, Alain Jugnon notes that the 
renewed interest in Nietzsche is stimulated by our times of distress and takes a political tone. 
For Nietzsche, of course, the name of this distress is nihilism. Again, there are many ways in 
which this distress might be explored with Nietzsche (for example, through the notion of ‘post-
truth,’ through populist ressentiment, and so on). Yet for Stiegler and others, this distress is 
linked to technology, which is a deeply political issue insofar as the technological mediation 
of human life affects our ‘being together.’ In the pages of the 2016 volume, a radical 
discrepancy of views is expressed regarding the meaning of technologies for human life, and 
how they might feature in the deepening of nihilism, or the coming of the Übermensch. This 
incipient debate revolves around the concept of the ‘transhuman.’  
 
Taking a bearing from these French readings, I want to explore the question of what ‘Nietzsche 
today’ might mean for us today. I will do this by developing an interpretive framework based 
on the points selected above: looking back to the themes of humanism and capitalism among 
the Nietzscheans of 1972, and then to those of technology and transhumanism in the ‘new’ 
Nietzscheans. The guiding thread throughout it all – again, an interpretive choice among many 
possible in Nietzsche’s hydra-headed corpus – is the politics of difference. For Nietzsche, given 
his central concern with nihilism, politics is never simply a matter of (say) distributive justice, 
or the most appropriate institutions of government, but concerns the sense of meaning and 
value, the affirmation of life, we are capable of. Let me begin, then, by introducing some 
diagnostic terms around the notion of nihilism which will allow us, at the end of this survey, 
to draw some conclusions, however partial and provisional, concerning Nietzsche and the 
politics of difference today.7 
 
 
                                                 
6 “What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come 
differently: the advent of nihilism”. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Preface 2, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. 
Hollingdale, New York 1968. 




Beginning with Nietzsche, nihilism is presented as highly ambiguous, and he and many 
subsequent thinkers have attempted to clarify it by distinguishing certain types. Nietzsche, for 
example, names some of the main types as religious nihilism, passive nihilism, active nihilism, 
and complete nihilism.8 At the risk of complicating matters further (but rather, I hope, with the 
effect of clarifying them), I want to introduce a typological distinction between what I shall 
call ‘reductive’ nihilism and ‘abyssal’ nihilism. These terms express what seem to me to be 
two extremes or poles at which feelings of meaninglessness (that is, ‘existential’ nihilism) 
manifest. Throughout the literature on nihilism, from Jacobi to the recent Nietzscheans, both 
these manifestations are evident again and again. On the face of it, they seem to be opposites. 
 
Reductive nihilism indicates the feeling that certain perspectives, structures, or forces have 
eliminated everything that might provide value and meaning in life, reducing everything to a 
narrow frame of reference which cannot support what is required for life affirmation. For 
example, in the first philosophical use of the term nihilism, Jacobi complains to Fichte that his 
idealist philosophy is nihilistic, since it reduces the scope of our knowledge to nothing but the 
ego: 
 
If the highest upon which I can reflect, what I can contemplate, is my empty and pure, naked and 
mere ego, with its autonomy and freedom: then rational self-contemplation, then rationality is for 
me a curse - I deplore my existence.9 
 
More commonly, reductive nihilism has been associated with critiques of capitalism, science, 
and technology, with their capacities to ‘disenchant’ the world, to reduce value to exchange 
value, nature to abstract laws, and the world to manipulable objects (see Marx and Heidegger, 
for example). Reductive nihilism frequently accompanies gains in knowledge, supposed 
certainties, and strongly established structures and institutions. What is claimed with the 
accusation of nihilism, however, is that these gains have reduced away everything that might 
make life worth living. 
 
                                                 
8 An indispensable analytical survey of these types is provided by Alan White: „Nietzschean Nihilism: A 
Typology“, International Studies in Philosophy 14.2 (1987), 29-44.   
9 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, „Open Letter to Fichte“, trans. D.I. Behler in Philosophy of German Idealism, ed. E. 
Behler, New York 1987, 135.  
Abyssal nihilism, on the other hand, expresses a radical absence of all meaningful values, and 
typically accompanies the collapse of frames of reference. The gold standard expression for 
this is the one famously associated with Nietzsche: the death of God. Abyssal nihilism may 
result from the breakdown of religious belief, but also, as Nietzsche clearly teaches us, with 
everything that might be designated by ‘God’ as the placeholder for the highest values: belief 
in a ‘true world’, in a given morality, a true grasp of the natural world, of our own selves, etc. 
The collapse of meaningful frames of reference can produce a feeling like plunging into an 
abyss, and life can correspondingly seem meaningless because it lacks all purpose or goal.10 
Despite the fact that the reductive and abyssal forms of nihilism appear to inhabit opposite 
poles, they may of course be seen as complimentary, and as frequently developing together: 
the reductive processes of abstraction and rationalisation degrade the social relations and 
structures which provide meaning and value, thus giving rise to abyssal nihilism. I will return 
to these themes in my conclusion. 
 
As is well known, Nietzsche sketched a project for the overcoming of nihilism through a 
deepening of nihilism itself, such that it is a kind of self-overcoming. Now, without being able 
to repeat any of these arguments in detail here, I want to note that an important development 
of the idea of nihilism since Nietzsche is that many subsequent thinkers have deeply 
problematized the idea of attempting to overcome it, and have often sought modes of resistance 
or oblique strategies in the face of what seems like an intractable aporia. To briefly note a 
couple of such influential developments: Heidegger argued (explicitly against Ernst Jünger, 
but also in response to Nietzsche) that nihilism cannot be overcome through an exertion of will, 
as though it is an external problem to be solved, because it determines who were are, and is 
itself constituted through willful assertion (bound up with the subject/object metaphysics of 
modernity and subjective domination of the objective world).11 Second, the problem of 
overcoming nihilism was seen in the light of the Hegelian dialectic, particularly in France. A 
problem then appears for Nietzsche’s project of overcoming nihilism through total affirmation, 
as affirmation implies negation in Hegelian logic, so any affirmation inevitably reinstitutes a 
negation and opposition characteristic of nihilism.12 These themes merge to form an 
                                                 
10 On the metaphor of the abyss, see David K. Coe, Angst and the Abyss: The Hermeneutics of Nothingness, 
New York, 1985. 
11 See „On the Question of Being“ in Pathmarks, ed. W. McNeill, Cambridge 1988; Nietzsche vols. 1-4, trans. 
David Farrell Krell, London, 1981-87. 
12 See for example Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, New York 1983; Maurice 
Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson, Minneapolis and London, 1993. 
understanding of nihilism in the contemporary situation as characterised by the loss of hope 
that existential meaninglessness can be overcome, either through redemptive individual 
experience, or through the modern dream of collective social emancipation.13 With these 
considerations concerning nihilism in mind, let us turn now to some of the themes explored at 







I want to take just two examples of thinkers who presented papers at Cerisy, in which the theme 
of a politics of difference is strongly evident: Pierre Klossowski and Jean-François Lyotard. 
Many have been surprised and puzzled that the French Left intelligentsia took Nietzsche – 
ostensibly an extreme Right-wing thinker – as a major source of political inspiration in the 
1960s and –70s. On the face of it Nietzsche’s politics would appear to be diametrically opposed 
to Marx’s: while Marx strove to overcome class exploitation, Nietzsche seems to defend some 
version of it. However, as Klossowski’s analysis shows, Nietzsche’s critique of bourgeois and 
industrial culture can be read as parallel to Marx’s, and this has allowed French Nietzscheans 
with Marxist orientations to appropriate Nietzsche for their own political agendas. Moreover, 
Nietzsche helped the French poststructuralists, who had become disillusioned with mainstream 
Marxism, to turn the very meaning of ‘the political’ in a new direction. 
 
These themes are at the heart of Klossowski’s Cerisy paper, „Circulus Vitiosus“.14 This, his 
last published writing on Nietzsche, summarizes key aspects of his previous, highly-influential 
Nietzsche interpretation, and links them explicitly to questions of contemporary politics. 
Klossowski sees Nietzsche as uncannily prophetic of political developments in the twentieth 
century, and constructs an interpretation of Nietzsche’s own political thought as evolving 
around the notion of ‘conspiracy’ (complot). Unsurprisingly, his treatment of Nietzsche’s 
politics focuses on the categories of master and slave. Klossowski contends that the slaves of 
the contemporary world are all those who work at menial tasks without knowing the overall 
goal for which they work. The masters, on the other hand, are those who are able to exploit the 
                                                 
13 On reductive and abyssal nihilism, and the arguments against an overcoming of nihilism, see my Nihilism in 
Postmodernity: Lyotard, Baudrillard, Vattimo, Aurora CO 2009. On Deleuze specifically, see my „Deleuze, 
Nietzsche, and the Overcoming of Nihilism“, Continental Philosophy Review 46.1 (2013), 115-147. 
14 Pierre Klossowski, „Circulus Vitiosus“, trans. Joseph D. Kuzma, The Agonist 2.1 (2009): 31-47. 
labour of the masses towards their own ends. The slave ‘caste’ is associated with what 
Klossowski calls the ‘gregarious’, a term indicating herd morality, while the masters are those 
rare individuals (‘singular cases’, in Klossowski’s terminology) who are able to create and 
legislate values. However, the problem for contemporary politics is that the weak have 
prevailed over the strong; the slaves have instituted a cultural order which suppresses potential 
masters. Nietzsche’s political task is to reverse this situation and restore the masters to their 
proper place. For Nietzsche, the slaves have dominated through a complex alliance of 
Christianity and morality, which creates an ideal of community in which individuals are all of 
the same, mediocre level. Nietzsche sees contemporary science, and Darwinism in particular, 
as complicit in slave morality, insofar as it aims towards, and attempts to justify, the 
preservation of the species as a collection of mediocre individuals.  
 
Now, Nietzsche introduces an important distinction between false and true masters, which 
prevents any possibility of identifying his ideal political system directly with the class 
exploitation of capitalism that Marx critiques. The false masters are in fact Marx’s bourgeois 
exploiters, the “industrialists, military men, bankers, business men, bureaucrats, etc.”15 
According to Nietzsche these false masters are unconscious slaves, because the aims they 
pursue are perfectly confluent with, and actively promote, herd morality. Nietzsche sees the 
capitalist system as contributing to the levelling of humanity because everything becomes 
homogenized in universal commodity exchange, and all value judgements become mercantile. 
The capitalist system itself promotes the loss of any meaningful goal for humanity, because it 
increasingly focuses on efficient means for the circulation of commodities as an end in itself. 
In a note which Klossowski sees as particularly prophetic, Nietzsche identifies global economic 
management as the high-point of social levelling and nihilism:  
 
Once we have that imminent, inevitable total economic administration of the earth, mankind will be  
able  to find its best meaning as a piece of machinery in the administration’s service: as a tremendous 
clockwork of ever smaller, ever more finely ‘adapted’ cogs; as an ever-increasing superfluity of all 
dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force, whose individual factors 
represent minimal  forces,  minimal values .16  
 
                                                 
15 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, trans. Daniel W. Smith, London 2005, 121. 
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, ed. Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge, Notebook 10, 
Autumn 1887, 10[17], 177. Klossowski quotes this note both in „Circulus Vitiosus“ (35) and in Nietzsche and 
the Vicious Circle (122-23). 
The true masters, on the other hand, are the strong types who are able to legislate values and 
the meaning of life, and whom Nietzsche characterizes collectively as a ‘contemplative’ caste. 
These true masters are able to turn the activities of the false masters, as well as the labouring 
of the masses that these false masters direct, to their own ends. Nietzsche sees these 
contemplative individuals as forming a conspiracy which aims to overturn the existing order 
of false masters and herd morality, and to institute what he sees as a ‘just’ political system of 
exploitation aimed towards higher ends.  
 
How does this conspiracy unfold? The strategy Nietzsche outlines is not to decrease the 
levelling processes of planetary economic planning, but to contribute to and exacerbate them, 
with the idea that such levelling will of necessity produce a counter-movement with the 
potential to transform the existing order. (This is the political counter-part to Nietzsche’s 
advocacy of active nihilism as a strategy aimed at pushing nihilism to a point of self-
overcoming.) This counter-movement is produced by the system of economic utility itself as 
the waste and surplus which it cannot use as means; which it cannot incorporate into its efficient 
functioning.  
 
The notion of conspiracy in this Nietzschean sense suggests a new model of community. In the 
discussion following Klossowski’s paper at Cerisy, Gilles Deleuze clearly summarises the 
difference between community as traditionally conceived (‘society’), and the new notion of 
community posed by Klossowski’s work on Nietzsche: 
 
What we call a society is a community of regularities, or more precisely, a certain selective process 
which retains select singularities and regularises them. [….] But a conspiracy – this would be a 
community of singularities of another type, which would not be regularised, but which would enter 
into new connections, and in this sense, would be revolutionary.17                                                         
 
Moreover, the possibility suggested by Nietzsche is that links between singularities in a 
‘conspiratorial’ community would have the eternal return as their criteria. The significance of 
this is that, according to Klossowski’s analysis, the lived experience of the eternal return 
explodes the identity of individuals. What this amounts to is an attempt to conceive of 
communities – groups and whole societies – beyond the notion of identity. Indeed, Deleuze 
                                                 
17 In Klossowski, „Circulus Vitiosus“, 46-7. 
highlights this elsewhere in asserting that “Klossowski’s entire work moves towards a single 
goal: to assure the loss of personal identity and to dissolve the self”.18  
 
Klossowski does not repeat the arguments linking the eternal return to the dissolution of the 
principle of identity in his „Circulus Vitiosus“ paper, so we must look to his previous writings. 
Of particular significance here is the paper he presented at the 1964 Royaumont colloquium on 
Nietzsche, incorporated in Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle as chapter 3 of that book. 
Klossowski calls the eternal return a ‘vicious circle’ – or ‘circulus vitiosus,’ in Latin – because 
it is deeply paradoxical, on at least three major counts: with respect to reality, knowledge, and 
the self. In classical philosophical logic, the coherence of each of these themes is supported by 
the ‘principle of identity’. The ‘circulus vitiosus’ is the name, in medieval scholastic 
philosophy, for a logical paradox which undermines coherent argumentation. Following 
Nietzsche’s association of the eternal return with the circulus vitiosus in Beyond Good and Evil 
56, he develops the idea of eternal return is a logical paradox which undermines the principle 
of identity. In the modern philosophical tradition, the self is associated (exactly how is a matter 
of debate) with the subject, itself dependent on the principle of identity – the subject is the self-
same consciousness, the underlying constant, which guarantees the possibility of knowledge 
and the grasp of (objective) reality. According to Klossowski, however, the experience of the 
eternal return undermines the supposed identity of the experiencer (and is thus in this respect 
paradoxical). As a first point, Klossowski notes that as the eternal return strikes me as a 
revelation, I must also become aware of having been the one who had forgotten the knowledge 
of the eternal return, and of the necessity of again becoming this person who had forgotten it. 
Moreover, considering the endless repetition of every moment through which I have passed 
forces me to recognize that there is no stable ‘I’ which has persisted throughout these changing 
states: the perspective of an eternal time explodes the notion of a stable self, which is contingent 
upon the framework of a limited ‘time-slice’ in which self-identity seems relatively plausible. 
Of the subject who recognizes and wills the eternal return, Klossowski writes: 
 
This subject is no longer able to will itself as it has been up to now, but wills all prior possibilities; 
for by embracing in a single glance the necessity of the Return as a universal law, I deactualize my 
present self in order to will myself in all the other selves whose entire series must be passed through 
                                                 
18 Gilles Deleuze, „Klossowski or Bodies-Language“ in Logic of Sense, trans. C.V. Boundas, M. Lester, and C.J. 
Stivale, London 1990, 283.  
so that, in accordance with the circular movement, I once again become what I am at the moment I 
discover the law of the Eternal Return.19 
 
The eternal return is then connected to Nietzsche’s cultural politics, according to Klossowski, 
because it acts as a ‘principle of selection’, dividing the slaves from the masters: the masters 
are the one who are able to accept and affirm the dissolution of the self and the loss of meaning 
and goal. 
 
For Klossowski, the capitalist system presents a gross caricature of the eternal return insofar as 
it reduces human life to the service of the circulation of commodities, without end or goal (just 
as the eternal return presents the world as a continual circulation of moments, which have no 
other goal than to return to themselves through endless repetition). However, the ‘true’ 
meaning of eternal return is precisely what challenges the capitalist system by revealing what 
cannot be translated into economic value, and is thus only recognized as waste or surplus in 
the system of commodity exchange. This political meaning of the eternal return was also taken 
up by other French Nietzscheans, and is developed by Lyotard in the paper he presented at 
Cerisy. 
 
This paper, „Notes on the Return and Kapital“,20 mobilises the ‘libidinal’ philosophy he was 
then working out under the influence Deleuze and Guattari and the Freudo-Marxism of the 
time. Under the name of “neo-nihilism”, he presents an analysis of capitalism as a force which 
liquidates both archaic or pre-modern forms, and the forms through which capitalism itself has 
developed in modernity.21 Lyotard celebrates this widespread liquidation, asserting that “[t]he 
dissolution of forms and individuals in the consumer society must be affirmed”.22 The problem 
with capitalism is not at all this dissolution (Marx and Engel’s famous “All that’s solid melts 
into air”), but rather, that this process of dissolution of structures is limited by the ‘law of value’ 
which proposes an equalization between goods which are exchanged in the system through the 
universal equivalent of money. Like Klossowski, Lyotard poses this as a problem of two 
                                                 
19 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 45. 
20 Jean-François Lyotard, „Notes on the Return and Kapital“, trans. Roger McKeon, Semiotexte 3.1 (1978), 44-
53. 
21 Lyotard writes: “Kapital…is metamorphosis without end or purpose. Such a metamorphosis operates on the 
one hand as a dissolution of old pre-capitalist institutions and on the other hand as a self-dissolution of its own 
institutions, constantly undone and redone.’ “Notes on the Return and Kapital”, 47. 
22 Lyotard, „Notes on the Return and Kapital“, 51. 
versions of the eternal return, one which might be termed the return of the Same (capitalism), 
and the other, the return of the Different (Nietzsche’s ‘authentic’ thought): 
 
When a process reduplicates identical effects, it becomes established, closes up, gets blocked in 
objects and subjects, devices and inscriptions, in set quantities and intervals, in structures and 
representations. Metamorphosis, if it were repetitive in the customary sense, that is if it were merely 
regulated, if it observed rules of constant spacing […] would amount to a systemic and 
representational closure. The Return would follow the course of structure. 
 
Such is the meaning of Nietzsche for us today. The regulated return is Kapital. Affirmation is, shall 
be, the dissolution of the single rule of Kapital, i.e. the law of value.23 
 
In Lyotard’s libidinal terms, this becomes a matter of ‘intensity’ (a term which is also 
significant for Klossowski). The capitalist system regulates exchanges and establishes 
institutions, and these regulations have the effect of stable structures which channel libidinal 
energies and maintain them at relatively low levels. For Lyotard, the ‘Nietzschean’ strategy in 
relation to capitalism should, instead, be “to raise or maintain intensity at its highest level in 
order to obtain as strong (Macht) an energetic metamorphosis as possible. In such a process 
does affirmation reside”.24 Nietzsche’s theme of life-affirmation becomes, for Lyotard, who 
passes it through Freud, the affirmation of intense (very high or very low) libidinal energies, 
and the transformations such intensities perform in systems.  
 
Lyotard then asks how such a Nietzschean politics would be possible, and what form it might 
take. The answer he sketches gives us an insight into the profound resonance of these readings 
of Nietzsche with the times, when they are taken on the political level: 
 
Holding up production, uncompensated seizures (thefts) as modalities of consumption, refusal to 
“work,” (illusory?) communities, happenings, sexual liberation movements, occupations, squattings, 
abductions, productions of sounds, words, colours, with no “work of art” intensions. Here are the 
“men of profusion,” the “masters” of today: marginals, experimental painters, pop, hippies and 
yippies, parasites, madmen, binned loonies. One hour of their lives offers more intensity and less 
intention than three hundred thousand words of a professional philosopher. More Nietzschean than 
Nietzsche’s readers.25 
                                                 
23 Lyotard, „Notes on the Return and Kapital“, 46-47. 
24 Lyotard, „Notes on the Return and Kapital“, 49. 
25 Lyotard, „Notes on the Return and Kapital“, 52-3. 
 
We see here, then, the association of Nietzsche’s thought and a Nietzschean politics with the 
counter-culture and the legacy of the (then still very recent) events of May ’68. The emphasis 
is on ‘underground’, marginal activities which destabilise the existing order of society, dissolve 
its institutions, and undermine the capitalist law of value.  
 
In sum, what we see from this gloss of these two philosophers whose Nietzsche interpretation 
was presented at Cerisy in 1972 is a concern to read Nietzsche along with Marx as a critic of 
capitalism, and a critique of humanism (broadly defined) which sees the bourgeois self as a 
nihilistic structure which needs to be critically destroyed through a dissolution of individual 
subjectivity. It is a politics of difference on both counts: capitalism is critiqued for subsuming 
differences to the law of equivalence in exchange, and difference is affirmed as a 
countermovement to nihilism through the dissolution of identity. These concerns are wedded 
to the Marxist project of overcoming capitalism and the Nietzschean project of overcoming 
nihilism, which are viewed as significantly parallel and compatible, despite their differences. 
Arguably, we may see these tendencies as taking as their target reductive manifestations 
nihilism, especially as they are expressed through capitalism and the structures which are seen 
to uphold it, including social institutions and the self as a fixed identity. The aim is to increase 
active nihilism, to hasten the dissolution of old forms and values so that they might make way 





Let us move now to a consideration of how things stand at present, or at least a few signs of 
this from Pourquoi nous sommes Nietzschéens. Again I will select just two papers, those of 
Stefan Lorenz Sorgner and Bernard Stiegler, this time to indicate a debate within the common 
theme of Nietzsche and technology.27 Across a number of publications on the topic, Sorgner 
                                                 
26 This affirmation of active nihilism is quite evident in both Klossowski and Lyotard. For Klossowski, the 
thought of Eternal Return is what enables the shift from passive to active nihilism („Circulus Vitiosus“, 33), 
while Lyotard is even more explicit: “Here is a political path: to harden, to deepen, to accelerate decadence. To 
assume the perspective of active nihilism, not by remaining at the simple (depressing or admiring) evidence of 
the destruction of values: to get one’s hands dirty in their destruction, to go ever further into incredulity, to fight 
against the restoration of values. Let us travel far and quickly in this direction, let us be undertakers in 
decadence …” Jean-François Lyotard, „A Brief Putting in Perspective of Decadence and of Several 
Minoritarian Battles to be Waged“, trans. Taylor Adkins, Vast Abrupt (2018), 1-20: 4. ({ HYPERLINK 
"https://vastabrupt.com/2018/03/12/lyotard-brief-putting-perspective-decadence/" }) 
27 In order to give a little further weight to the suggestion that technology is a significant issue for contemporary 
Nietzscheanism, we may note a monograph by one of the editors of the 2016 volume: Alain Jugnon, Nietzsche 
has claimed Nietzsche as a predecessor and ally of transhumanism.28 His contribution to the 
2016 volume, „Nietzsche as Educator: From Heraclitus to Transhumanism“, is a largely 
personal statement, answering the question of why he is a Nietzschean starting from a 
biographical point of view. However, several key theoretical points are made. First, Nietzsche 
is positioned as important for transhumanism because of his penchant for both naturalism and 
interpretation.29 As Sorgner briefly glosses this, Nietzsche posits that there are multiple 
‘psychophysiological quanta’, each of which is a perspective on the world.30 Transhumanists 
generally tend toward naturalism, and Sorgner notes that the majority of them have been 
Anglo-Saxons working in the traditions of utilitarianism and analytic philosophy. While they 
have addressed many quite specific problems and issues, Sorgner suggests that these 
orientations have prevented them from addressing ‘the big questions’, and from engaging with 
issues of broad cultural meaning and value. Such issues involve the way that naturalism tends 
towards an overcoming of the broad metaphysical distinction between mind and matter in the 
philosophical tradition, leading to a ‘posthumanism’ in which human beings come to be seen 
as complex arrangements of matter rather than as ontologically distinct. According to Sorgner, 
this constitutes a paradigm shift with massive cultural implications, which are far from being 
fully unfolded. Allowing us to address such issues, he suggests, is the great value of Nietzsche’s 
thought. And it is here, in the meeting of scientific naturalism and culture, that Sorgner 
positions his own approach, which he refers to as ‘Nietzschean transhumanism’, or 
‘metahumanism’ (the latter term implying beyond humanism, and between posthumanism and 
transhumanism).31  
 
Second, Sorgner acknowledges and seeks to defend transhumanism from the criticisms of high 
profile intellectuals such as Francis Fukuyama, Jürgen Habermas, and Peter Sloterdijk. The 
key issue of criticism addressed is biological eugenics, where, especially for many 
contemporary Germans, transhumanism arouses fears of the selective breeding programs of the 
National Socialist ideology. Against such criticisms, Sorgner asserts that transhumanism can 
and must be wedded to values of autonomy, liberty, and pluralism. Unlike the Nazis, 
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transhumanists conceive of human enhancement as a private and individual affair, not an 
enforced collective social programme. Moreover – and it seems to me that this is a key idea – 
he insists on the pluralization of conceptions of the good. While in general transhumanism 
seeks to use science and technology to promote conditions of ‘the good life’, it should not 
promote any one privileged conception of the good, but rather a plurality of possible goods.32 
 
Once again, however, we must look to previous works to see some of this author’s primary 
reasons for the position we are examining. Sorgner has argued that transhumanism has some 
significant points of similarity with Nietzsche’s thought, especially with regard to the positive 
valuation of science, and of the goal of the future enhancement of human beings (the 
Übermensch, for Nietzsche, and the technologically enhanced human as a ‘posthuman’ species, 
for the transhumanists). Moreover, he has argued that Nietzsche can provide a justification for 
transhumanism missing from much transhumanist discourse. Instead of simply proposing that 
human technological enhancement is somehow exciting or an obvious good in itself, Nietzsche 
provides a framework for understanding the goal of enhancement through a broad perspective 
on human life and value as it has unfolded in culture and through history. For Nietzsche the 
Übermensch is a meaning-giving concept which is consistent with a secular and scientific 
culture: it is the goal for which we can strive after the death of God, and which gives an 
immanent meaning to a world stripped of its transcendent double.33 
 
Bernard Stiegler’s views on Nietzsche and transhumanism could not be more diametrically 
opposed to Sorgner’s. Like Habermas and others, Stiegler is vitriolic about transhumanism, yet 
his motivations lie entirely elsewhere than the fear of biological eugenics: his fear is with the 
effects of information technology, the ‘technicization’ of reason. He invokes Nietzsche in 
support of this, arguing that transhumanism is the apotheosis of nihilism in the contemporary 
world. His contribution to the 2016 volume is entitled „The Great Bifurcation towards the 
Neganthropos: Exceptions and Selections in Noodiversity“. In passing, he uses the adjective 
‘hypernihilist’, and I have chosen to adopt this term as a general characterization of his critical 
position, since a main claim of his here is that we need to reinterpret nihilism in the 
contemporary world, in terms of the advent of information technologies in conjunction with 
capitalism. Stigeler writes: “Is it not astonishing to observe how much the considerations of 
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Nietzsche are current to the epoch of algorithmic governmentality and big data […]?”34 He 
picks up and transforms several Nietzschean notions, especially the ‘great politics’ and ‘great 
hygiene’ of the last period, in terms of the need to defend exceptions against the levelling power 
of averages. Stiegler interprets these themes as applying to contemporary technological 
capitalism, which he argues brings the nihilistic crisis of values to a head more quickly than 
Nietzsche himself foresaw, because ‘big data’ radically exacerbates the averaging effects and 
destruction of exceptions that Nietzsche warned against. Contemporary capitalism deploys 
automatic calculative rationality, through the algorithms of information technologies, with the 
effect of reducing individuals to market consumers. Stiegler’s Nietzscheanism then appears as 
a politics of difference to the extent that it asserts the value of exceptions against the 
homogenising tendencies of capitalism and big data.35 
 
This analysis depends on Stiegler’s earlier works, particularly on his theses about originary 
technicity and libidinal economy. He has argued, first, that there is a co-constitution of the 
human and technics, such that human beings become who and what they are through their 
interactions with the technical world, producing a view of humans and machines far more 
intimate that that of the traditional view. This remains the best-known aspect of Stiegler’s work, 
developed in the Technics and Time series.36 Second, Stiegler has developed a critique of 
contemporary technological capitalism around the notion of libidinal economy (stemming from 
Freud, Marcuse, and object-relations theory). He argues that contemporary technologies ‘short 
circuit’ the development of our capacities to desire in a healthy way, reducing desire to bare 
drives which demand immediate satisfaction, and undermining our ability to project 
meaningful long-term goals and invest them with value.37 In short, for Stiegler, what he calls 
‘hyperindustrial’ capitalism is destroying our ability to individuate in a healthy manner, that is, 
to become healthy individuals capable of valuing things and feeling that life is worth living. In 
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his interpretation of Nietzsche, this is then understood as the power big data exerts in 
‘averaging’ us, turning us into consumers of short-term satisfactions.  
 
Polemically, Stiegler asserts that transhumanism brings nihilism to completion. What he sees 
in transhumanism is the assertion of a complete hegemony of calculative, probabilistic 
rationality, which is entirely in capitulation to the logic of consumer capitalism. Stiegler asserts 
that the Nietzschean transvaluation itself needs to be transvalued, in no small part because he 
sees the figure of the Übermensch as the phantasmatical lure of the transhumanists – such as 
we have just seen with Sorgner, perhaps (though Stiegler makes no direct reference to him, and 
quite possibly has only other transhumanists in mind38) – and does not believe it can then be 
an effective figure of transvaluation in the contemporary epoch. Moreover, he believes there 
are two significant oversights in Nietzsche’s thought; issues he was not able to think, but which 
are essential for understanding and responding to (hyper)nihilism today: exosomatisation, and 
entropy.  
 
‘Exosomatisation’ is a term that Stiegler has increasingly used since 2014 in place of his earlier 
preferred term ‘exteriorisation’ (taken from André Leroi-Gourhan) to refer to the intimate 
relation between internal (somatic) processes and exterior inscriptions (i.e. technics), and the 
idea that the former in fact depend on the latter as their condition of possibility. This point, 
then, is that Nietzsche could not adequately think technics in its intimate relation with human 
being and becoming. On the second point, Stiegler laments that Nietzsche rejected the idea of 
entropy not long after its first formulation,39 because he (Stiegler) believes that entropy, and its 
counterpart negentropy, are essential concepts with which to think life, and its associated 
values, in the 21st century and beyond. He asserts that “the theory of entropy redefines the 
question of value”40 and that “the question of entropy and negentropy among human beings 
[is] the crucial problem of the everyday life of human beings and of life in general, and, finally, 
of the universe in totality for every form of life”.41 This theory of energetic tendencies at the 
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cosmic level then sets the agenda for what Stiegler believes needs to be done to confront the 
crisis of contemporary nihilism in all its forms:  
 
Reading Marx and Nietzsche together in the service of a new critique of political economy, where 
the eco-nomy has become a cosmic factor on a local scale (a dimension of the cosmos) and therefore 
an eco-logy, must lead to a process of transvaluation, such that both economic values and those 
moral devaluations that result when nihilism is set loose as consumerism are “transvaluated” 
through a new value of all values, that is, by negentropy – or negative entropy, or anti-entropy.42  
 
In short, Stiegler asserts that “the systemic and systematic valorization of negentropy”43 is the 
necessary basis for the revaluation of values Nietzsche called for. This is in effect a privileging 
of order, individuation, and social structures and institutions, which he sees as radically 
undermined by the entropic forces of industrial consumer capitalism. 
 
Tracy Colony helps us to understand the wider significance of Nietzsche for Stiegler by 
drawing out references to the German philosopher in Stiegler’s earlier works and 
contextualizing them in his overall project.44 One of the major points Colony highlights is that 
for Stiegler, Nietzsche is important as a thinker of tragedy because he understands it essentially 
as an earlier form of thought in contrast to the oppositional thinking characteristic of 
metaphysics. Tragedy thinks the co-constitution of forces or tendencies as a generative 
difference; that is, it thinks in terms of differential forces in productive relation, rather than 
opposition, where both are irreducibly necessary. This contrasts with the Christian-Platonic 
thinking of oppositional categories and the morality of good and evil. Along similar lines, 
Stiegler interprets Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals in his own terms as expressing the 
transition from the tragic, pre-metaphysical thinking of what he calls the ‘default’ of origin, to 
the sin characteristic of Christianity and metaphysics.45 For Stiegler, the relation between the 
human and technics needs to be understood as having no assignable origin, as they were 
historically co-constituted, and he calls this the ‘necessary default’. Metaphysics, by contrast, 
understands the human as prior to technics, which then appears as a fall, a corruption, and the 
introduction of sin, setting up the metaphysical opposition between the human and technics. 
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What, then, are we to make of this debate over transhumanism in contemporary 
Nietzscheanism, and, by broad implication, the role of technology in contemporary nihilism? 
Matters are not so simple as being for or against transhumanism, and invoking Nietzsche as a 
support, as the juxtaposition of Sorgner’s and Stiegler’s manifest positions might suggest. 
Many aspects of transhumanism have been criticised from a Nietzschean perspective, first by 
Keith Ansell-Pearson in his book Viroid Life,46 then in the responses to Sorgner collected in 
Nietzsche and Transhumanism: Precursor or Enemy? Some of the main criticisms revolve 
around 1) the value and status of science in relation to the ascetic ideal, and 2) transhumanism 
as manifesting aspects of the Enlightenment and modernity which Nietzsche criticised. What 
is at stake with the first point is how to understand Nietzsche’s attitude(s) towards science. 
While Sorgner tends to simplify and over-state Nietzsche’s sympathy for the ‘scientific spirit’, 
perhaps most evident in the free spirit trilogy, critics have pointed out that he also identified 
science with the ascetic ideal, and implicated it in forms of nihilism and ressentiment towards 
life.47 Transhumanism, for its part, seems to play into the ascetic ideal insofar as it treats the 
human condition, and in particular mortality, as something to be condemned and overcome.48  
 
Transhumanism is typically expressed as a form of Enlightenment thought, which celebrates 
the application of reason to human life and structures itself as a teleological, historical narrative 
of progress. As such, it seems at odds with Nietzsche’s critiques of reason and modernity. For 
example, it tends to advocate the overcoming of suffering and the utilitarian goal of the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number, and is thus a long way from Nietzsche’s assertion of the 
necessity of a ‘higher pessimism’ which affirms suffering as the ground for self-overcoming, 
and of the flourishing of higher types over the levelling effects of the herd.  
 
Yet there is no reason to believe that there is only one form that transhumanism might take. 
Broadly defined, transhumanism means only the application of technology for the enhancement 
of human life. How that enhancement is to be conceived will of course depend on our 
conception of the good, and here Sorgner’s point about the pluralization of the good becomes 
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important. A feature of contemporary life in many countries today is that we live in pluralistic 
cultures where there is no one agreed-upon ideal of the good life. More deeply, more 
philosophically, we might acknowledge that we still don’t know in what the good life consists. 
The value of debates such as that around Nietzsche and transhumanism is precisely that it 
exposes the presuppositions about the good which are bound up with our attitudes towards 
‘liminal’ ideas and practices such as human technological enhancement.  
 
Stiegler’s radical opposition to transhumanism (like that of others) proceeds as though there is 
a single, uniform meaning this term might take – one that fully and uncritically embraces 
‘algorithmic rationality’. And yet, Stiegler’s work in fact gives us reasons to believe that an 
alternative, and potentially more ‘Nietzschean’, form of transhumanism is conceivable. This 
would be a transhumanism which, precisely, repurposes contemporary technologies to fight 
industrial proletarianization and enhance capacities for individuation, as Stiegler and his Ars 
Industrialis group call for.49 Briefly, this possibility is justified by the conceptual links between 
Nietzsche’s idea of enhancement, what Foucault calls the ‘technologies of the self’ (techniques 
de soi), and Stiegler’s own conception of originary technicity.50 
 
As Sorgner acknowledges, Nietzsche conceived human enhancement not in terms of 
technological prostheses, but in terms of the strength to interpret and affirm life and legislate 
values. On the face of it, culture and education remain clearer means to achieve this form of 
enhancement than anything contemporary sciences and technologies have to offer. What is 
required, it seems, are actually quite ancient technologies, such as study, reading, writing, 
dietary regimes and physical training, and in general all those things which Foucault, drawing 
on Pierre Hadot, identified as techniques of self-cultivation in the philosophical schools of the 
ancient Greek and Roman worlds. Stiegler does tend to privilege such techniques as more 
effective for healthy individuation than the ways in which information technologies are 
typically deployed in our hyperindustrial capitalist system. Yet at the same time, there is 
nothing essential about this. Stiegler’s thesis of originary technicity gives us reason not to draw 
a clear line of separation between a ‘human essence’ and technologies, and in fact he explicitly 
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connects new information technologies with the technologies of the self of which Foucault 
wrote: 
 
information and communication technologies are precisely spiritual technologies, and this means 
that they just as much raise again the question of memory techniques, which Foucault analyzed in 
the sense of techniques of the “writing of the self.” He returned to this in order to qualify the Greek 
term hypomnémata, which has been the major philosophical question since Plato—he having already 
defined writing as hypomnésis, that is, as a memory technique.  
 
Considered as mnemo-technologies, industrial technologies of spirit are new forms of 
hypomnémata; and as hypomnémata of another age, particularly in the Stoic and Epicurean schools, 
and in primitive Christianity, in the Rome in which the Greek skholè became the Roman practice of 
the otium, industrial technologies of spirit call for new practices, that is, after all is said and done, 
new social organizations.51 
 
Rather than celebrate or decry transhumanism outright in Nietzsche’s name, the more 
interesting question is what a Nietzschean transhumanism might possibly be. The challenge for 
a Nietzschean transhumanism, which I can only gesture towards but not explore here, would be 
how to understand the predominant effects and the latent potentials of current and future 
technologies in relation to the project of responding to nihilism. 
 
However such a Nietzschean transhumanism might be developed, it should take into account 
some significant hesitations I believe we should have in the face of Stiegler’s claims to being 
a Nietzschean, and how he understands nihilism and its counter-movement today. These 
hesitations focus on his discussions of entropy and negentropy, which in fact resonate with 
aspects of the transhumanism he decries. In a follow-up note to Sorgner's original article, Max 
More adds that the advent of transhumanism, at least in some of its influential forms, not only 
bears unconscious similarities to Nietzsche’s thought, but was in fact directly influenced by 
Nietzsche.52 More claims that it was he who introduced the term transhumanism and in doing 
so he was directly influenced by Nietzsche (who he also occasionally quotes in his seminal 
writings on the topic). Significantly, More explicitly centres the values of transhumanism 
around what he calls ‘extropy’, his own neologism for the inverse of entropy (more typically 
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called negentropy or negative entropy), and develops them through his activities as 
motivational speaker for businesses and head of a cryogenics company.  
 
Stiegler is aware of ‘extropianism’, and critically distinguishes it from his own valuation of 
negentropy.53 Yet what the example of Max More shows is, if not a straightforward complicity 
of Stiegler’s views with the transhumanism he criticises, then at least the sheer interpretability 
of the terms he privileges. This is further demonstrated by Lyotard’s choice to attach exactly 
the opposite valuations to the same categories, associating entropy with the unexpected, the 
unthought, and the chance event, and negentropy with the attempt to totally calculate and 
programme the future in the interests of complete security and the reliable reproduction of 
profit. For Lyotard, the contemporary metanarrative which persists after the decline of 
modernity replaces the human with negentropic complexity as the hero of the narrative (much 
as we see with transhumanism). This perspective vitiates ethics and justice, as, Lyotard 
suggests, from this point of view it would seem better to eliminate the populations of the Third 
World because they are an entropic drain on global negentropic becoming.54 
 
Yet Stiegler often seems to present the thesis of entropy and negentropy as something like a 
naturalization of values, a grounding of values in the science of life (frequently referring, for 
example, to Schrödinger’s seminal What is Life?55). Yet what is missing here is the dimension 
of interpretation which cannot be shorn from Nietzsche’s naturalism, as we have seen noted 
by Sorgner above.56 Moreover, even if we do adopt a ‘factual’ naturalistic perspective on 
values, the way Stiegler presents entropy and negentropy are suspect from a purely scientific 
viewpoint. He refers to Georgescu-Roegen as an authority, but this influential economist’s 
work on entropy is today generally discredited, because he made the mistake of conflating 
energy and matter in his work on the supposed entropy of economic systems.57 More 
importantly, there is a complex story to be told here – to which I cannot hope to do justice, but 
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merely gloss briefly – regarding the lineage of the concept of entropy from Norbert Weiner 
and cybernetics, through Simondon, to Stiegler. Isabelle Stengers has cautioned that in our 
reception of Simondon today, we should be cautious of the partial and selective way he took 
up concepts from science. In particular, drawing on the work of her collaborator Illya 
Prigogine, she notes that Simondon’s understanding of ‘metastable equilibrium’ was limited to 
its functioning in the individuation of ‘equilibrium’ structures, such as crystals (a privileged 
example for Simondon). In such processes, entropy retains its ‘traditionally’ understood 
function as simply a loss and dissipation leading to disorder. However, a more complex picture 
of the role of entropy has in fact emerged with discoveries concerning metastable equilibrium. 
Here, when a system is in a far from equilibrium state, entropy can act as a force of production 
in ‘dissipative structures’, in which order emerges from chaotic states.58 Esra Atamer has noted 
how the conceptions of entropy in thinkers such as Shrödinger and Weiner are limited by 
tending to support the old vitalist notion that life is opposed to ‘natural physical forces’, leading 
to their positing of an opposition between negentropy to entropy.59 It seems that Stiegler has 
uncritically taken up this model, which should now be challenged in relation to more recent 
science. Atamer draws out the implications of this for Simondon, which are equally relevant 
for Stiegler: we should understand entropy and negentropy not as oppositions, but as co-
compositional tendencies, and recognise the possibility of ‘dissipative individuation’.60 
 
However, questions of science are not the key stake here; evaluative categories are, and the 
implications they have for ethical, political, and existential matters. As we have noted above, 
Stiegler recognises the importance of Nietzsche’s thought of tragedy as involving the 
intertwining of co-compositional tendencies – a thought prior to the nihilism ushered in by 
Platonic-Christian oppositional thinking. However, what could be more ‘Christian’ (in 
Nietzsche’s pejorative sense) than setting up an absolute evaluative opposition between life 
and death, order and disorder, creation and destruction, with the terms negentropy and entropy? 
This is the heart of what is wrong with many versions of transhumanism, and Stiegler seems 
to be repeating this gesture. He reintroduces oppositional thought, and even the values of good 
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and evil, at a meta-level: the co-contstitutional tendencies that he recognises as valuable are 
both categorised on the side of negentropy, while all that falls on the side of entropy is 
condemned.61 This is a long way from Nietzschean higher pessimism and tragic affirmation, 
and Stiegler would do well to remember Nietzsches’s warning, in Gay Science 109: “Let us 
beware of saying that death is opposed to life”.62  
 
When we think of the co-compositional tendencies of Nietzsche’s tragic thought, we cannot 
but think of the Apollonian and the Dionysian.63 Now, in his analysis of the human condition 
and the ‘tragic’ response to it in The Birth of Tragedy, the Dionysian is precisely a force of dis-
individuation, a collapse of the principium individuationis, which is ecstatic and intoxicating, 
and which attenuates the suffering attendant on our condition as individuated beings. The 
Dionysian is described as a tendency which has “little regard for the individual, even seeking 
to annihilate, redeem, and release him”.64 It “causes subjectivity to vanish to the point of 
complete self-forgetting”.65 We should, then, extend hesitations regarding Stiegler’s assertion 
of the evaluative categories of entropy and negentropy along two lines: 1) entropy may play a 
productive role in individuation (in dissipative structures), and 2) the Dionysian as a force of 
dis-individuation should be tragically affirmed. 
 
 
I would like to conclude by recalling the typological distinction with which I began, that of 
reductive and abyssal nihilism. This distinction, I suggest, allows a certain perspective, 
simplified and overly-schematic to be sure, through which to compare some of the main themes 
of Nietzsche interpretation I have discussed, both historic and recent. Interpreters of the ‘60s 
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and ‘70s such as Klossowski, Lyotard, and Deleuze focus on the destruction of reductive 
nihilism through strategies of dissolution of the self and existing social structures. Arguably, 
these attempts remain tied to the strategy of overcoming, both Nietzschean and Marxist, and 
the belief that meaning can arise once nihilism is completely destroyed. If the hope of a decisive 
overcoming is abandoned, however, a danger becomes apparent: that the strategy of responding 
directly only to reductive nihilism may in fact exacerbate abyssal nihilism. Arguably, this 
danger is particularly prominent in contemporary society, where many existing structures and 
institutions are already significantly deregulated. By directly responding only to reductive 
nihilism, then, Klossowski, Lyotard and other earlier Nietzscheans threaten to exacerbate the 
abyssal nihilism which afflicts contemporary societies. 
 
By contrast, with Stiegler we see something of the opposite extreme: a response to the nihilism 
of hyperindustrial capitalism, in which information technologies play a decisive role, through 
the affirmation of negentropy in response to abyssal nihilism. Stiegler’s primary concern is 
with the possibility of individuation, of properly forming selves and social institutions, rather 
than their dissolution. Stiegler’s work is vitally important today, and supplies a necessary 
corrective to the one-sided focus of the 70s philosophers, but he also risks squandering the 
legacy of the philosophical avant-gardes in veering too far towards what could be interpreted 
as a reassertion of bourgeois values. Against this, recalling the image of Nietzsche presented 
in earlier French philosophy, the monster of energy who can affirm suffering and affirm 
destruction and dissolution as necessary to processes of change, becoming, and life itself, is 
also a necessary corrective. 
 
How we are to understand Nietzsche, in relation to the various interpretations of a politics of 
difference we have seen above, of course depends entirely on the view we take of the 
contemporary world. Klossowski and Lyotard write as though we are caught in a machine of 
generalised regulated repetition, the forces of which need to be deregulated so the machine can 
explode and its parts dissolve, metamorphosing the system and setting us free. Stiegler, on the 
other hand, writes as though we are hooked up to this machine and dependant on its survival, 
while it is running dangerously low on energy and is about to stop functioning at all. 
Undoubtedly, the world and its primary political challenges no longer appears to us as they did 
for the Nietzscheans of ’72. Many analyses have tried to explain how the ‘system’ of 
technoscience and capitalism have mutated such that the strategies of the countercultural 
revolution and poststructuralist philosophy of this period – strategies aimed at the dissolution 
of the self, the State, and traditional social structures – seem naive, or even counterproductive, 
in today’s world.66 
 
The machine itself is beyond our grasp; all we can do is look for signs of the whole. It is also 
complex, a mechanosphere, a patchwork of little machines, local machines. Even if we need to 
inject some energy into the ‘big machine’ to save us from entropy, that doesn’t mean we don’t 
need to exacerbate entropy in local machines, including ourselves, to dissolve old forms and 
let new ones breath. The two images of Nietzsche as creator and destroyer supply concepts 
which might help in thinking complex form of life in processes of becoming, as ambiguously 
intertwined as Apollo and Dionysus, and just as tragic in their modest capacity to help us 
understand and deal with our contemporary predicament. Rather than choose strategies which 
work towards a decisive overcoming of nihilism, I would argue that with our reading of 
Nietzsche today we should try to find and employ strategies which meet both reductive and 
abyssal manifestations of nihilism on their own terms. This means recalling the past radical 
readings of Nietzsche as much as inventing new ones. Such a double strategy would aim to 
open spaces for the enhancement of the value of life against the encroachment of these dual 
nihilistic currents. This approach would be a way of responding to nihilism beyond the hope 










                                                 
66 Of particular note for the perspectives we have explored here is Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello’s The New 
Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Gregory Elliot, London 2018. See Stiegler’s analysis of this work, at once 
sympathetic and critical, in the first part of The Lost Spirit of Capitalism: Disbelief and Discredit, volume 3, 
trans. Daniel Ross, Cambridge 2014. For Stiegler’s own extended analysis of the political shortcomings of the 
poststructuralist generation of French philosophers, see his States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st 
Century, trans. Daniel Ross, Cambridge, 2014. 
